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INFORME FINAL

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TÍTULO PROYECTO : KNOWLEDGE-RELEVANT RESPONSIBILITY, EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM, AND DISTRIBUTED COGNITION

DISCIPLINA PRINCIPAL : FILOSOFIA ANALITICA
GRUPO DE ESTUDIO : FILOSOFIA
INVESTIGADOR(A) RESPONSABLE : LEANDRO DE BRASI
DIRECCIÓN :
COMUNA :
CIUDAD : SANTIAGO
REGIÓN : METROPOLITANA

INFORME FINAL
PROYECTO FONDECYT INICIACION

OBJETIVOS

Cumplimiento de los Objetivos planteados en la etapa final, o pendientes de cumplir. Recuerde que en esta sección debe referirse a objetivos desarrollados, NO listar actividades desarrolladas.

Nº	OBJETIVOS	CUMPLIMIENTO	FUNDAMENTO
1	The third and final goal of the projects was to investigate the ramifications of the proposed combination of de facto reliabilism and social responsibilism for the internalism/externalism debate.	TOTAL	A detailed study of the different ways to construct the internalist position, such as various formulations of mentalism and accessibilism, its motivations and difficulties was carried out (3.1). The visit of B.Madison, involving 3 seminars and a talk, contributed greatly to it. The consequences of the approach developed (given goals 1 & 2) were studied and it´s been argued that a reformulation in anti-individualist terms of the internalism/externalism debate is required, given the plausibility of this sort of approach, if it is to remain interesting. So it´s been shown that some common assumptions of the debate can be challenged and that it can be usefully redefined (3.2). An article was written making the case. A seminar on the topic was delivered. An article that further explores the kind of phenomenon that knowledge is, given the approach developed in the project, was written. This research was presented at a colloquium.

Otro(s) aspecto(s) que Ud. considere importante(s) en la evaluación del cumplimiento de objetivos planteados en la propuesta original o en las modificaciones autorizadas por los Consejos.

RESULTS OBTAINED:

With regard to the period 2014, the project aimed to deal with specific goal 1: to find a satisfactory combination of *de facto* reliability and epistemic responsibility by developing a knowledge-relevant anti-individualist notion of responsibility. The main results of the research carried out during this period can be found in the article "Reliability and Social Knowledge-Relevant Responsibility" (*Trans/Form/Açao* Vol.38, No.1, pp.187-212, 2015. *WoS*), where it is argued that a novel anti-individualist account of knowledge-relevant responsibility provides us with a satisfactory combination, within a traditional objectivist framework, of *de facto* reliability and epistemic responsibility that seems required for knowledge.

This anti-individualist approach yields the following combination of reliability and epistemic responsibility as reflective endorsement of the knowledge-yielding procedures: (as a first approximation and ignoring Gettier-cases, defeaters and factivity) S knows that *p* iff (i) S's belief that *p* was formed by a reliable procedure, AND EITHER (ii.a) the procedure is reflectively endorsed by some member(s) of S's community and (ii.b) reliance on the procedure is a standard or established practice of the community, OR (iii) S herself reflectively endorses the procedure.

One way of appreciating whether the above approach is the right kind of move consists in considering problem cases (such as BonJour´s Norman, Lehrer´s Mr. Truetemp, Weinberg *et al*.´s Faluki, and Plantinga´s Paul) and this approach seems able to deal with them, as shown in the article "Reliability and Social Knowledge-Relevant Responsibility." In that article, possible objections to the approach are also pre-empted.

One important lesson of the above research is that we must take advantage of our pervasive division of labour, characteristic of any human society, and shift the epistemic burden to those epistemic agents who reflectively endorse the rooted procedures that we exploit as members of the community if we are to satisfy a responsibilist condition on knowledge. And given this epistemic interdependence, not all of the non-objective epistemic conditions on knowledge need to concern the cognitive states of the *knower herself*. In particular, the knower needn't possess positive grounds for exploiting the knowledge-yielding procedures as long as they are *socially endorsed* (ii.a-b, above). One should then hold that the perspectival epistemic dimension that contributes towards the knowledge-relevant status of a true belief can depend on properties and actions of subjects other than the knower.

Indeed, moving away from an individualistic framework allows us to make sense of *knowing* naïve subjects, such as Norm (a case developed in the aforementioned article) with regard to clairvoyance and some of us with regard to other capacities, such as introspection (see related article from period 2015 below). It is the social element of chance that precludes knowledge in the naïve subject cases, as in the cases of Norman, Mr. Truetemp and Paul (this is further developed in another article, see period 2016 below).

With regard to the period 2015, the project aimed to deal primarily with specific goal 2: to investigate to what extent the Distributed Cognition research program in cognitive science lends support to the social responsibilism previously developed. The main result of the research carried out during this period was that the distributed cognition approach does not render the social responsibilism proposed significantly more cognitively possible. Given some common set of constraints on distributed systems, the nature of the groups which constitute them are not very likely found in the cases of the divisions of labour associated with the proposal developed.

This proposal suggests that, as seen, the reflective endorsement of the procedures need not be performed by every member of the epistemic community and so relies on an *epistemic interdependence* (which goes beyond testimony). In fact, the endorsement seems often the product of some sort of epistemic policing that prompts the correction or perfection of inadequate procedures (e.g. Bruner 2013, Goldman 2011). More precisely, the proposal depends on a division of *epistemic* labour to be in place, where some members of the community responsibly endorse the procedures for others. In many cases, it also relies on a division of *cognitive* labour with respect to the responsible endorsement of any given procedure. That is, a number of members of the epistemic community collaborate (through time) in this endeavour. There is no need for a single subject to do all the epistemic work herself for any one procedure.

This division of cognitive labour might seem to make the social endorsement of procedures a case of distributed cognition. The Distributed Cognition approach in cognitive science shares a commitment with other active externalist positions to criticizing and supplanting more traditional approaches to cognition that have not looked beyond the subject's brain to understand the

nature of cognition. It emphasizes the distributed nature of cognitive phenomena among individuals and/or artifacts and provides a framework for examining the interactions between people and/or artifacts that is not possible with traditional approaches. So this approach is well suited to capture the complex interdependencies between people in multi-person activities.

It is common in the current literature to require some sort of cognitive integration (for different varieties of cognitive integration, see e.g. Menary 2007, Pritchard 2010, Sutton 2010, Palermos 2014) in order to account for a distributed cognitive system. Given this minimal notion of cognitive integration, it is difficult that the division of cognitive labour required for the social endorsement of a knowledge-yielding procedure can be the product of a distributed cognitive system, as opposed to a scaffolded cognitive system (i.e. a cognitive system where cognition is environmentally supported; Sterelny 2010). The reason for this being that the required interactions will very likely be missing in most cases (this of course does not mean that the social endorsement could not be the product of a distributed cognitive system; it simply suggests that as a matter of fact most such endorsements will not be).

The above, however, does not affect negatively the cognitive plausibility of the view, since scaffolded cognitive systems are anyway a very widespread and general phenomenon (e.g. Sterelny 2003), of which distributed cognitive systems are special cases. Moreover, the plausibility of the view has been further defended on the article "The Peculiarity and Contingency of the Introspection of Belief" (*Filosofía Unisinos*, Vol.16, No.2, pp. 100-118, 2015. *WoS*). In this article, it is further argued that knowledge needn't be a reflective success *of the knower herself*. That is, although responsiveness to the world is required for knowledge, responsiveness to reasons is not. This article then further supports the idea that an individualist notion of epistemic responsibility is too demanding.

Furthermore, the research for the previous article also motivated the principal investigator to write, together with Prof. Marcelo Boeri (PUC), an article on the limitations of the first-person and the third-person perspectives to achieve knowledge of oneself. This article, "Self-Knowledge in the *Alcibiades I*, the *Apology of Socrates*, and the *Theaetetus*: The Limits of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives" (*Universum*, Vol.32, No.1, pp.17-38, 2017. *Scopus*), argues that knowledge of one's nature and character is not easy to attain by personal means (as opposed to knowledge of one's own present mental states—say, beliefs and desires) and that we must rely on other epistemic agents as a source of knowledge of oneself, hence further supporting our epistemic interdependence.

With regard to the methodology exploited in the article "Reliability and Social Knowledge-Relevant Responsibility", it is defended in the article "Craig-Style Epistemology and the Role of Intuitions in Epistemological Theorizing" (forthcoming in *Kriterion*; *Scielo*—and written in response to a worry which was raised to the principal investigator in a conference, *European Society for Philosophy and Psychology* 2015, where the research was presented). I had not defended the methodology exploited (namely, the legitimate use of intuitions in epistemological theorizing) and this article attempts to deals with two major challenges.

The first challenge consists in accommodating the results of "negative" experimental epistemology. This empirical work suggests that epistemic intuitions vary according to epistemically irrelevant factors. The second challenge concerns the possibility that our intuitions about the extra-mental phenomena to be explained are not an accurate guide to their true nature since our concepts are infected by ignorance and error. However, following Edward Craig's work, it is argued that we can pre-empt both potential objections. With regard to the first challenge, we can referee between intuitions and reduce the impact of conflicting intuitions on epistemological theorizing by exploiting different sources of evidence and particularly functional considerations. With regard to the second challenge, even if we grant that there is a significant possibility that our concepts are not properly attuned to features of natural kinds, we can suggest, following Craig, that knowledge is a social kind: roughly, a category that human beings impose on the world in response to central needs and interests. As he says, knowledge is "something that we delineate by operating with a concept which we create in answer to certain needs" (1990:3). So our concept of knowledge is meant to play a crucial role in determining what knowledge is, which allows us to make sense of the fact that our intuitions can be revealing of its nature.

With regard to the period 2016, the project aimed to deal primarily with specific goal 3: to investigate the ramifications of the above combination of *de facto* reliabilism and social responsibilism for the internalism/externalism debate. The main results of the research carried out during this period can be found in the paper "Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant

Anti-Individualist Responsibility" (submitted to *Manuscrito*; *WoS*), where it is argued what the main motivation for epistemic internalism is (namely, the guidance conception of epistemic responsibility) and what the consequences of the approach developed are. In particular, the paper argues that epistemic anti-individualism is compatible with the main rationale behind internalism, so it seems that we should reformulate the debate in anti-individualistic-friendly terms in order to keep it interesting, as opposed to easily rejecting internalism, given the kind of epistemic interdependence argued for in this project.

With respect to the motivation, some internalist component of knowledge is meant to stop the belief being true by accident from the subject's perspective (BonJour 1985, 2003). This perspectival appropriateness stops it from being, in a sense, lucky (Pritchard 2005). And according to BonJour and many others this (reflective) luck precludes knowledge because the alleged knower would believe "blindly." And so it is argued that in order for the knower to avoid believing truly by (reflective) luck, she should reflect on the grounds of her belief. This requires that the agent has reflective access to her epistemic situation. And this puts the agent in a position to exert some sort of (reflective) *guidance* regarding the formation of her beliefs.

It seems fair to say that this idea of guidance is what is behind the requirement of reflecting on one's sources of knowledge in order to avoid (reflective) luck. In fact, Goldman (1999), talking more generally about epistemic justification, identifies this idea of guidance with the main thrust for the internalist case. But there is no reason to think that the relevant guidance can only be achieved at the personal level. We can also understand it as operating in cases of epistemic interdependence, where the epistemic standing of a belief depends on properties and actions other than the knower's.

For example, it would be legitimate to consider the agent's belief as being *socially* guided if the belief was formed as a result of following established epistemic practices that are reflectively endorsed by the epistemic community (just as the approach developed suggests). And it would be wrong to consider a belief that is socially guided in this way as being accidental in the relevant sense. So the idea is that a belief being guided by the relevant evidence can be preserved in a non-individualist (social) setup. In other words, belief-guidance doesn´t entail individualism (i.e. the thesis that a given knowledge-relevant normative status depends exclusively on factors that lie inside the cognitive agency of the knower).

So if guidance is the main rationale behind internalism and if this guidance doesn´t entail individualism, then individualism needn´t constraint internalism. So an individualist constraint should be argued for: that is, it doesn´t come for free with the internalist motivation. And in the absence of such an argument, we can consider this guidance as not requiring individualism and in turn conceive the attainment of epistemic responsibility in a non-individualist manner. Accordingly, given a favourable socio-epistemic environment, when the reasons are accessible in this way, or as we could say, are *socially* accessible (that is, a kind of access mediated by the epistemic community in the way suggested above), the requirement of epistemic responsibility can be satisfied, as the Norm case developed in "Reliability and Social Knowledge-Relevant Responsibility" illustrates.

Moreover, far from being a rare and incidental phenomenon, our epistemic interdependence is a generalized and socially structured phenomenon. In epistemic communities, members not only share information. Our epistemic reliance on others isn´t limited to our testimonial practice. Our epistemic interdependence can be, and is, much more pervasive: people not only act as informants, they also act as exemplars, trainers, and teachers. Some are exemplars for one as a knower, others enable one to fine-tune and improve one´s epistemic standards and practices. We depend on others in order to calibrate one's own standards and to maintain appropriate standards. This genuine and pervasive phenomenon of epistemic interdependence has been widely recognized in recent times, in particular by social and feminist epistemologists (e.g. Hardwig 1985, Kitcher 1994, Longino 2002, Nelson 1993, Townley 2011, Webb 1993).

In fact, a more fine-grained picture about epistemic agency should comprise the normative environment in which epistemic standards are endorsed, learned and maintained communally. As argued earlier in this project, the social endorsement of the procedure exploited is crucial in the attainment of the positive epistemic status required for knowledge. In particular, although the knower needn't possess the positive grounds for the endorsement of the procedures that she and other members of the community rely on, someone does. And the clearest example of subjects who appreciate the rationale behind our belief-forming procedures and who would also promote their revision through time if regarded necessary, is that of *regulative epistemologists*, whose job is to actively engage in the project to remedy the deficiencies of our epistemic

practices (to increase their reliability—more on this below, in relation to another submitted article). And this kind of epistemic interdependence is crucial if we want to account for the positive epistemic status concerning epistemic responsibility in a plausible way, as seen in "Reliability and Social Knowledge-Relevant Responsibility." So we need to and *can* understand the attainment of responsible belief in terms of our division of epistemic labour.

This sort of epistemic interdependence entails epistemic anti-individualism, which, in its general form, is the claim that the (positive) epistemic standing of a belief, or some such mental state, depends epistemically on properties and actions other than the knower's (cf. Carter and Palermos 2015, Pritchard 2015). But, of course, some might not find it plausible to think of this knowledge-relevant responsibility as a requirement that can be satisfied at the social level. This however just seems to be a remnant of the strongly individualist orientation of mainstream (analytical) epistemology (Kitcher 1994, Pritchard 2015), which has considered the individual subject as the only relevant agent in the attainment of epistemic statuses and which the Cartesian ideal of epistemic autonomy (metaphorically put, that the epistemic agent ought to stand on her own epistemic feet) seems to have helped establish. According to this picture, knowledge, for example, is taken to be an essentially private and personal achievement and so its responsibilist condition needs to be compatible with this. But, since relying on others, as seen, seems to be cognitively fundamental for beings like us (at least testimony should show this much—see also "Self-Knowledge in the *Alcibiades I*, the *Apology of Socrates*, and the *Theaetetus*: The Limits of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives," Burge 1993, Code 1987), any investigation into *human* knowledge should be at odds with this Cartesian ideal and its accompanying individualist framework. A solipsistic human knower is implausible in light of our nature and what we take ourselves to know, as it is argued in the paper "Knowledge as a Social Kind" (submitted to *Filosofía Unisinos*; *WoS*). In other words, the idea of an isolated, self-sufficient knower is incongruous with the epistemic interdependence of human lives (in all sorts of knowledge-seeking endeavours, not merely complex ones).

Taking epistemic interdependence seriously it's not, as seen, just a matter of expanding our testimonial dependence, it also means recognising the more complex practices of interdependence found in our division of epistemic labour that are not reducible to transmitting knowledge. It is a mistake to take information sharing or transmission as exhausting the forms of epistemic interdependence to which our beliefs are subjected (see e.g. Goldberg 2011, Kallestrup and Pritchard 2013, Pritchard 2015, Carter and Pritchard 2017). And importantly for our purposes, neglecting the complexity of our epistemic interactions distorts the internalism/externalism debate. Of course, anti-individualist positions needn´t be incompatible with epistemic internalism (see e.g. Pritchard 2015). But if our epistemic dependence is not merely limited to the transmission of knowledge (as seen) and applies also with regard to those epistemic standings (such as epistemic responsibility) where the internalism/externalism debate is at home, epistemic individualism is false. So if we accept an individualist constraint on epistemic internalism, we end up with a position trivially false and so belittling the significance of this debate.

Given all of the above, a liberalization of epistemic internalism about knowledge-relevant responsibility seems called for. More specifically, we should liberalize this internalism by expanding the class of epistemic factors to incorporate those accessible to others: as we said before, those socially accessible. It shouldn´t be confined to factors only accessible to the knower herself. We have seen no reason to suppose that this confinement is mandatory given that the main motivation for internalism needn´t rely on individualistic commitments. In other words, the access requirement in this accessibilism can be accommodated either at the personal or social level. So, given that no considerations push internalism towards individualism and that the main motivation for internalism can be accommodated in an anti-individualist manner, there is no barrier to stop the liberalization of internalism to be compatible with epistemic anti-individualism. This would be a welcome move given that the Cartesian ideal of epistemic autonomy and its accompanying individualism are both rightly questioned nowadays, given our thorough epistemic interdependence that goes beyond testimony. So if this internalism/externalism debate is to remain interesting (i.e. not easily or trivially resolvable one way or the other), it must evolve accordingly. In other words, if we are to keep this debate interesting, we should reformulate internalism in anti-individualistic-friendly terms.

In fact, we can talk of an anti-individualistic turn in epistemology, which is clearly appreciated in the new and exciting social and feminist epistemologies that have been developed since the end of the 20th century. The internalism/externalism debate still needs to catch-up to this

development in order to find again a home in the epistemological landscape. Without it, the debate is rendered uninteresting. So epistemic internalism about knowledge-relevant responsibility needs refinement in its formulation and not rejection. The case for the rejection of such an internalism remains to be made in a debate that we can still think of as interesting, given that it requires us to further investigate the plausible but not yet established idea of capturing epistemic responsibility in anti-individualist terms.

Still, the paper "Knowledge as a Social Kind" was written to further increase the plausibility of the approach developed and of the reformulation suggested (in "Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility"). This paper explores the idea that knowledge is a social kind. As seen above, the methodology exploited relies partly on intuitions and its defence relied partly on the idea that knowledge is a social kind. But not many are sympathetic to a social kind approach to knowledge, so this paper was written in part to further support the methodology and so the account developed in the project. But another aim of the paper is to pull together, in a coherent way, all the research carried out throughout the project to deliver a more encompassing view about knowledge, which captures the anti-individualist responsibility developed. In particular, it aims to show that such an account would be in line with central tenets of traditional epistemology (as understood by Goldman 2010) and that, importantly, it doesn´t succumb to epistemic relativism. The social nature of the account does not render knowledge a *purely* social product, unconstrained by any *objective* epistemic criteria of adequacy. Not only are the procedures subject to subjective epistemic evaluations (endorsement), but also to objective ones (*de facto* reliability). So not any procedure goes and some procedures are better than others. Anyhow, the absolutism/relativism dichotomy is false and some sort of epistemic pluralism is a sound, legitimate option (see also Heckman 1990).

Moreover, the paper also aims to further motivate two major insights behind social and feminist epistemologies, in particular: our epistemic interdependence concerning knowledge and the role of social regulative practices in understanding knowledge. First, one overlap between (much) social and feminist epistemologists (e.g. Potter and Alcoff 1993, Schmitt 1994) is their emphasis on the importance of the social/communal aspects of knowledge-yielding practices, *contra* Descartes and the tradition he established. For them, there is no viable "Robinson Crusoe" conception of knowledge (e.g. Kvanvig 1992, Nelson 1993). The main focus of dissatisfaction with traditional epistemology derives from its neglect of our epistemic interdependence: the sort of interdependence that renders traditional individualist positions about knowledge doomed. However, and second, one overlap between these feminist and social epistemologists, on the one hand, and Descartes, on the other, is their commitment to the *regulative epistemic project* which aims to determine appropriate ways of obtaining knowledge (and other epistemic goods) and which mainstream epistemology hasn´t pursued. This regulative project tries to say which ways of going about the quest for knowledge are the good ones (Stich 1990). And many historical figures, such as Bacon, Descartes and Locke, among others, have pursued it, motivated, at least in part, by very practical concerns. In fact, regulative epistemology is a response to perceived deficiencies in people's epistemic conduct, and thus is strongly practical and social.

Moreover, the account of knowledge as a social kind developed in the paper allows us to make sense of both these insights. It not only accommodates but also explains why regulative practices which guide our epistemic conduct and which are sensitive to social location have a legitimate role in the theory of knowledge. As seen above, regulative epistemology and the guidance it is meant to provide play an important role in the development of the project´s anti-individualist view of responsibility and of the reformulation of internalism. Also, it accommodates and explains why our thorough epistemic interdependence has a crucial role to play in the theory of knowledge. As seen above, this epistemic interdependence also plays an important role in the development of the project´s anti-individualist view of responsibility.

So, not only is this approach of knowledge friendly to social and feminist epistemologies (it provides them with a framework on which their insights blossom and they cannot be dismissed as not being "real" or "proper" epistemology, as some seem tempted to do), but also, and more importantly, provides the project´s novel anti-individualist view of responsibility with a friendly background in which it can flourish. A view which falls within a truly social regulative epistemology (i.e. an epistemology which aims to guide our epistemic conduct and which renders our epistemic reliance on others ubiquitous) and which can accommodate traditional tenets that render it anyway "real epistemology" (given Goldman´s characterization).

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PROJECT:

Research Visits

Between 30th January and 17th February 2015 and between 12th March and 30th March 2016, the Principal Investigator (PI) visited the King´s College London Philosophy Department as a Visiting Research Fellow. The investigator had full institutional support and access to all facilities, including the KCL Maughan Library and Senate House University of London Library, as well as access to all electronic databases. During his research stay, the investigator could work systematically on the project. That involved reading and analysis of literature as well as discussions with different members of the Philosophy Department, some of which specialised on topics related to the project. The principal investigator also took part in a Departmental Research Seminar, where he presented his research to the KCL academics, and two study and reading groups. This visit not only helped the investigator progress through the project but also it enabled him to strengthen the academic and political links with the philosophy community at University of London, and in particular King's College London.

Outreach Activities

Aside from the talks given by the PI ("Socially-Distributed Knowledge-Relevant Responsibility" at the *European Society for Philosophy and Psychology 2015*, in Tartu, Estonia, on 14th July 2015; "The Peculiarity and Contingency of the Introspection of Belief" at the *IV Congreso of the Latin-American Assosiation for Analytic Philosophy (ALFAn)*, in San José, Costa Rica, on 25th May 2016; "Knowledge as a Social Kind" at the *Coloquio Problemas Metodológicos y Temáticos en las Ciencias Sociales*, in Santiago, Chile, on 23rd January 2017), the PI also gave the talk "¿Por qué la filosofía es fundamental en la formación de los jóvenes?" in *Protagonistas 2030: Ideas de Futuro, Encuentros de El Mercurio*, in Santiago, Chile, on 25th October 2017, to a non-academic audience, mainly aimed at young people and subscribers of the newspaper, to explain the value of philosophy and which exploited as an example material from the research done for the project.

The PI also wrote an opinion piece for *RedSeca*, "Filosofía, Democracia y Tecnología de Información: La Filosofía como entrenamiento ciudadano en la Era Digital" (http://www.redseca.cl/filosofia-democracia-y-tecnologia-de-informacion-la-filosofia-como-entrenamiento-ciudadano-en-la-era-digital/), that, just as the previous talk, touches on our pervasive division of epistemic labour.

The PI also organized the visit of Prof. Goldberg (19th April—27th April 2015), who gave a public talk (*Mutuality in Assertion*) and an open 3-day seminar (*Taking Social Epistemic Responsibility Seriously*) on topics related to the project.

The PI organized the visit of Prof. Palermos (24th September—08th October 2016), who gave a public talk (*Knowledge 2.0*) and an open 3-day seminar (*Extended and Distributed Knowledge*) on topics related to the project.

The PI organized the visit of Prof. Madison (14th—23rd August 2017), who gave a public talk at the UAH (*Epistemic Justification and Its Value*) and an open 3-day seminar (*Epistemic Internalism/Externalism*) on topics related to the project.

And all three organized events had a free entrance, were widely publicised and open to all (academic and non-academic) members of society.

Training of Human Resources

The PI directed a MA thesis during 2016 on the topics related to the project. The thesis´ grade was 7 and the viva´s grade 6.9.

The PI gave 5 MA and PhD seminars at the Alberto Hurtado University, from the first semester of 2015 to the first semester of 2017, on topics related to the project. In particular, the seminars were on contemporary issues on social epistemology, contemporary issues in analytical epistemology, extended and distributed knowledge, and the internalism/externalism debate. The seminars open to students from other universities and disciplines that had an interest on the subject matter as well as non-academic members of society. All seminars were openly publicized.

The PI organized and directed, together with Francisco Pereira, the open Reading Group *Mente, Lenguaje y Conocimiento*, from 2015 to 2017, where a series of different topics related to project were studied, such as extended and distributed hypotheses of cognition, as well as the work of the different visiting researchers. This reading group was open to all (academic and non-academic) members of society with an interest in the subject matter and openly publicised.

COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL

Nº Proyecto: 11140279
Nombre Colaborador (a) Extranjero (a):   BRENT JAMES MADISON
Afiliación Institucional Actual: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES UNIVERSITY
Fechas de estadía   **Desde :** 14/08/2017   **Hasta :** 23/08/2017

Describa las actividades realizadas y resultados obtenidos. Destaque su contribución al logro de los objetivos del proyecto. Si es pertinente, indique las publicaciones conjuntas generadas, haciendo referencia a lo informado en la etapa Productos. Agregue en la etapa anexos la información necesaria.

Dr. Brent Madison´s research focuses primarily on the internalism/externalism distinction in epistemology. His projects include providing new motivations for epistemic internalism and reconciling it with various prima facie problematic kinds of epistemic justification (e.g. memorial and testimonial justification). So his visit was extremely beneficial given goal (3) of the project.

Dr. Madison gave a three-day specialized seminar, titled ?Epistemic Internalism/Externalism? and a public talk during his visit, titled ?Epistemic Justification and Its Value.? The topics of the three related seminars were as follows: Seminar 1: Internalism and its Intuitive Motivations; Seminar 2: Internalism and its Theoretical Motivations; and Seminar 3: Internalism and its Problem Cases. All three seminars were aimed to motivate and defend a plausible version of internalism.

More particularly, these seminars focused on foundational issues in the epistemic internalism/externalism debate: what the distinction is, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. The seminars also examined the internalism/externalism debate as regards to specific cases thought to be especially problematic for internalism, namely: the epistemologies of memory, testimony, and religious belief.

Given the content of the seminars, Dr. Madison´s visit contributed to the development of the project since they touched upon mainly upon sub-goal 3.1, but also 3.2.

On the other hand, in the public talk Dr. Madison aimed to show that, while there has arguably been progress made in the internalism/externalism debate and its place in epistemology overall, one area that has seen little development is successfully motivating these rival views. Typically employed is the method of cases: thought experiments about clairvoyants, evil demons, chicken-sexers, infants and the elderly, as well as animals, among others. But with differing intuitions about the cases on both sides of the debate, the epistemic internalism/externalism dispute can look like a seemingly irresolvable debate in need of a new methodology. To advance the debate, Dr. Madison proposed that we think carefully about questions like the following: why ought we to strive for justified beliefs? Why are justified beliefs better than unjustified ones? Why care about justification? In answering these questions, his central thesis is that only epistemic internalism can makes sense of the fact that justification is something that we do, and should, care about in the way that we do.

This talk touched upon many issues relevant mainly to sub-goal 3.2, but also 3.1.

The visit of Dr. Madison also allowed me to have a series of one-to-one meetings with him to discuss in greater depth several issues touched upon in the seminars and talk as well other specific topics, and in particular to develop the proposed reformulation of the internalism/externalism debate. And so these discussions were also of great help to test the ideas developed in the project.

During his visit, Dr. Madison also made himself available to students from other universities and his visit helped create new links with the UAEU, where he is based.

PRODUCTOS

ARTÍCULOS
Para trabajos en Prensa/ Aceptados/Enviados adjunte copia de carta de aceptación o de recepción.

Nº :   1
Autor (a)(es/as) :   De Brasi, L.
Nombre Completo de la Revista :   Kriterion
Título (Idioma original) :   Epistemologia Craiguiana y el Rol de las Intuiciones en el Teorizar Epistemologico
Indexación :   SciELO

Envía documento en papel :   no

Archivo(s) Asociado(s) al artículo :

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unisinos_14960_53831_1_SM.pdf

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Nº :   4
Autor (a)(es/as) :   De Brasi, L.
Nombre Completo de la Revista :   Filosofía Unisinos
Título (Idioma original) :   The Peculiarity and Contingency of the Introspection of Belief
Indexación :   WoS
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8990_36674_1_PB.pdf

Nº :   5
Autor (a)(es/as) :   De Brasi, L.
Nombre Completo de la Revista :   TRANS/FORM/AÇAO
Título (Idioma original) :   Reliability and Social Knowledge-Relevant Responsibility
Indexación :   WoS
ISSN :
Año :   2015
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Autor (a)(es/as) : De Brasi, L.; Boeri, M.

Nombre Completo de la Revista : Universum

Título (Idioma original) : Self-Knowledge in the Alcibiades I, The Apology of Socrates and the Theaetetus: The Limits of the First-Person and Third-Person Perspectives

Indexación : SCOPUS   **Especificar :**

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universum_32_01_00017.pdf

OTRAS PUBLICACIONES / PRODUCTOS

Nº : 1

Autor (a)(es/as) : De Brasi, L.

Título (Idioma original) : Filosofía, Democracia y Tecnología de Información: La Filosofía como entrenamiento ciudadano en la Era Digital

Tipo de publicación o producto : Otros   **Especificar :** columna de opinion

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Editor (es) (Libro o Capitulo de libros) :

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Archivo(s) Asociado(s) al artículo :
RedSeca_Filosofi__a_Democracia_y_Tecnologi__a.pdf

Nº :   2
Autor (a)(es/as) :   De Brasi, L.
Título (Idioma original) :   ¿Por qué la filosofía es fundamental en la formación de los jóvenes?
Tipo de publicación o producto :   Otros   **Especificar :** charla publica

ISBN :
Editor (es) (Libro o Capitulo de libros) :
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País :   CHILE
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Páginas :
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Envía documento en papel :   no
Archivo(s) Asociado(s) al artículo :
programa_Protagonistas2030.pdf

CONGRESOS

Nº :   1

Autor (a)(es/as) :	De Brasi, L.
Título (Idioma original) :	Socially-Distributed Knowledge-Relevant Responsibility
Nombre del Congreso :	European Society for Philosophy and Psychology
País :	ESTONIA
Ciudad :	Tartu
Fecha Inicio :	14/07/2015
Fecha Término :	17/07/2015
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Vol. :	
Nº :	
Páginas :	
Envía documento en papel :	no
Archivo Asociado :	

ESPP_book_web_TL_12_16.07_.2015_.pdf

https://servicios.conicyt.cl/sial/index.php/investigador/f4_congresos/descarga/24208595/11140279/2016/163004/1/

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Nº :	2
Autor (a)(es/as) :	De Brasi, L.
Título (Idioma original) :	The Peculiarity and Contingency of the Introspection of Belief
Nombre del Congreso :	IV Congreso ALFAn
País :	COSTA RICA
Ciudad :	San Jose
Fecha Inicio :	23/05/2016
Fecha Término :	27/05/2016
Nombre Publicación :	
Año :	
Vol. :	
Nº :	
Páginas :	
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Titles_and_Abstracts_Alfan_2016.pdf

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Nº :	3
Autor (a)(es/as) :	De Brasi, L.
Título (Idioma original) :	Knowledge as a Social Kind
Nombre del Congreso :	Coloquio Problemas Metodologicos y Tematicos en las Ciencias Sociales

País : CHILE
Ciudad : Santiago
Fecha Inicio : 23/01/2017
Fecha Término : 23/01/2017
Nombre Publicación :
Año :
Vol. :
Nº :
Páginas :
Envía documento en papel : no
Archivo Asociado :
coloquio.pdf

https://servicios.conicyt.cl/sial/index.php/investigador/f4_congresos/descarga/24208595/11140279/2016/163112/1/

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TESIS/MEMORIAS

Nº : 1
Título de Tesis : Social Responsibilism and the Internalist/Externalist Debate regarding Epistemic Justification

Nombre y Apellidos del(de la) Alumno(a) : Fernando Alvear Sanhueza

Nombre y Apellidos del(de la) Tutor(a) : Leandro De Brasi

Título Grado : Magister
Institución : Universidad Alberto Hurtado

País : CHILE
Ciudad : Santiago
Estado de Tesis : Terminada
Fecha Inicio : 01/04/2016
Fecha Término : 15/12/2016
Envía documento en papel : no
Archivo Asociado :
tesis_Alvear4.pdf
https://servicios.conicyt.cl/sial/index.php/investigador/f4_tesis_memorias/descarga/24208595/11140279/2016/79878/1/
abstract_thesis3.pdf
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ANEXOS

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Nº :   3

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Archivo Asociado :   Epist_Soc_Programa_Mag_2015.pdf

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Nº :   9

Archivo Asociado :   manuscrito_acceptance_scholarone_manuscripts_De_Brasi.pdf

https://servicios.conicyt.cl/sial/index.php/investigador/f5_anexos/descarga/24208595/11140279/2016/80892/

Nº : 10

Archivo Asociado : manuscrito_scholarone_manuscripts_De_Brasi.pdf

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